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Licensing Requirements as a Coordination Mechanism for Entry

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  • Sherrill Shaffer

Abstract

Cheap talk, side payments, and arbitration are limited in their ability to coordinate asymmetric entry among symmetric potential entrants. Externally imposed licensing requirements may provide a viable mechanism to attain the desired asymmetric outcome in equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Sherrill Shaffer, 2004. "Licensing Requirements as a Coordination Mechanism for Entry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 24(3), pages 285-299, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:24:y:2004:i:3:p:285-299
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. K.P.V. O’Sullivan & Tom Kennedy, 2008. "Supervision of the Irish Banking System: A Critical Perspective," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 6(3), pages 20-26, October.
    2. K.P.V. O’Sullivan & Tom Kennedy, 2008. "Supervision of the Irish Banking System: A Critical Perspective," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 6(03), pages 20-26, October.
    3. repec:ces:ifodic:v:6:y:2008:i:3:p:14567232 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Suren Basov & Jan Libich & Petr Stehlík, 2010. "Stochastic Timing, Uniqueness, and Efficiency in Games," Working Papers 2010.01, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
    5. Sridhar Balasubramanian & Shantanu Bhattacharya & Vish V. Krishnan, 2015. "Pricing Information Goods: A Strategic Analysis of the Selling and Pay-per-Use Mechanisms," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 34(2), pages 218-234, March.

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