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Competition with asymmetric regulation of mobile termination charges

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  • Edmond Baranes
  • Cuong Vuong

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to explore the effectiveness of asymmetric regulation, which allows a new mobile network operator to set higher termination rates than the incumbent operator. We assume that there are two market segments: one in which operators compete on equal terms, with a new technology, and the other in which the entrant is at a disadvantage since the technology it offers is inferior to the incumbent’s. Results show that asymmetric regulation can create favorable conditions that allow the entrant to strengthen its market positioning, and enhance consumer net utilities and social welfare. This highlights the importance of the degree of network asymmetry and the ways in which consumers are split between the two market segments. Lastly, we show that asymmetric regulation can create greater investment incentives for the entrant which could effectively enhance social welfare. These findings can provide useful insights for regulatory policy. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Suggested Citation

  • Edmond Baranes & Cuong Vuong, 2012. "Competition with asymmetric regulation of mobile termination charges," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 204-222, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:42:y:2012:i:2:p:204-222
    DOI: 10.1007/s11149-011-9171-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Robles-Rovalo, Arturo & Díaz-Goti, Emiliano & Guarneros-Gutiérrez, Rodrigo, 2018. "The Nature and Magnitude of the Effects of Asymmetric Regulation of Mobile Termination Rates on the Mexican Retail Prices," 22nd ITS Biennial Conference, Seoul 2018. Beyond the boundaries: Challenges for business, policy and society 190426, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    2. Edmond Baranes & Stefan Behringer & Jean-Christophe Poudou, 2017. "Mobile Access Charges and Collusion under Asymmetry," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 127, pages 33-60.
    3. Stefan Behringer, 2012. "Asymmetric equilibria and non-cooperative access pricing in telecommunications," International Journal of Management and Network Economics, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 2(3), pages 257-281.
    4. Alexander Correa, 2019. "Asymmetric Networks and Access Charges," Journal of International Commerce, Economics and Policy (JICEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(01), pages 1-22, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Access charge; Asymmetry; Network competition; Regulation; D43; L11; L13;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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