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Effective regulation versus tacit collusion in the long-distance market: an empirical analysis

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  • Simran Kahai
  • David Kaserman

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  • Simran Kahai & David Kaserman, 2007. "Effective regulation versus tacit collusion in the long-distance market: an empirical analysis," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 247-257, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:32:y:2007:i:3:p:247-257
    DOI: 10.1007/s11149-007-9034-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Taylor, William E & Zona, J Douglas, 1997. "An Analysis of the State of Competition in Long-Distance Telephone Markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 227-255, May.
    2. Ward, Michael R, 1999. "Product Substitutability and Competition in Long-Distance Telecommunications," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(4), pages 657-677, October.
    3. Blank, Larry & Kaserman, David L & Mayo, John W, 1998. "Dominant Firm Pricing with Competitive Entry and Regulation: The Case of IntraLATA Toll," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 35-53, July.
    4. T. Beard & George Ford & R. Hill & Richard Saba, 2005. "The flow through of cost changes in competitive telecommunications: Theory and evidence," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 555-573, October.
    5. Karen Palmer, 1992. "A Test for Cross Subsidies in Local Telephone Rates: Do Business Customers Subsidize Residential Customers?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(3), pages 415-431, Autumn.
    6. Schwartz, Marius, 2000. "The Economic Logic for Conditioning Bell Entry into Long Distance on the Prior Opening of Local Markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 247-288, November.
    7. Alan D. Mathios & Robert P. Rogers, 1989. "The Impact of Alternative Forms of State Regulation of AT&T on Direct-Dial, Long-Distance Telephone Rates," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(3), pages 437-453, Autumn.
    8. MacAvoy, Paul W, 1995. "Tacit Collusion under Regulation in the Pricing of Interstate Long-Distance Telephone Services," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(2), pages 147-185, Summer.
    9. Kahai, Simran K & Kaserman, David L & Mayo, John W, 1996. "Is the "Dominant Firm" Dominant? An Empirical Analysis of AT&T's Market Power," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(2), pages 499-517, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yang, Jie & Ma, Tieding & Ma, Kai & Yang, Bo & Guerrero, Josep M. & Liu, Zhixin, 2021. "Trading mechanism and pricing strategy of integrated energy systems based on credit rating and Bayesian game," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 232(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Deregulation; Long-distance telecommunications; Tacit collusion; L1; L5;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy

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