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When Are Stable Rights to Rents Bad?

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  • Sutter, Daniel

Abstract

Stable, enforceable property rights over resources normally furthers economic efficiency. The author argues that stable rights to government created rents and wealth transfers, by contrast, generate inefficiency. Secure rights to receive transfers increases rent-seekers' incentive to make political investments creating new transfers. The author demonstrates the point using a two period rent-seeking game. Contestable transfers reduce the probability of establishing a transfer program and aggregate rent-seeking expenditures. Strengthening transfer recipients' rights increases the difficulty of eliminating a transfer program. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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  • Sutter, Daniel, 1999. "When Are Stable Rights to Rents Bad?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(1-2), pages 29-41, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:98:y:1999:i:1-2:p:29-41
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    Cited by:

    1. Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 1986. "Transfer seeking and avoidance: On the full social costs of rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 175-181, January.

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