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Was Knut Wicksell a conservative or a radical? A note on an early monograph by Knut Wicksell

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  • Charles Blankart

Abstract

The article reviews a small monograph by K. Wicksell entitled Our taxes. Who pays them and who should pay them? It sheds some light on why Wicksell, a radical of his time, was so conservative as an economist. This paradox comes because Wicksell, as an economist, is often brought in line with the unanimity principle. Correctly seen, Wicksell pleaded for general franchise and proportional representation under the unanimity constraint. This was a radical proposal in his time because it contributed to shift the burden of taxation from the poor to the rich by implementing the benefit principle. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

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  • Charles Blankart, 1998. "Was Knut Wicksell a conservative or a radical? A note on an early monograph by Knut Wicksell," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 355-365, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:94:y:1998:i:3:p:355-365
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1004907432335
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. J. H. Dreze & D. de la Vallee Poussin, 1971. "A Tâtonnement Process for Public Goods," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(2), pages 133-150.
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    1. Sergey Zhavoronkov & Konstantin Yanovskiy & Kirill Rodionov, 2015. "Political Factors of the Cuts and Surges in Government Spending: The Effects on Old Market Democracies and Post-Communist Countries," Working Papers 146, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, revised 2015.
    2. Blankart, Charles B:, 2014. "The Great Schism in the Theory of Public Finance. A Treatise in the Theory of Economic Thought," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100461, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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