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Optimal Effort Allocation by U.S. Senators: The Role of Constituency Size

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  • Atlas, Cary M
  • Hendershott, Robert J
  • Zupan, Mark A

Abstract

Legislators in a representative democracy are modeled as being able to allocate a fixed amount of effort between two objectives: national policymaking and local benefit-seeking. The model predicts that the effort allocated to local benefit-seeking should be a negative function of the population size of a legislator's constituency. The authors empirically test and confirm this prediction by examining the manner in which U.S. senators allocate their personal staff between home state and Washington D.C. offices. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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  • Atlas, Cary M & Hendershott, Robert J & Zupan, Mark A, 1997. "Optimal Effort Allocation by U.S. Senators: The Role of Constituency Size," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 92(3-4), pages 221-229, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:92:y:1997:i:3-4:p:221-29
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    Cited by:

    1. Gary Hoover & Paul Pecorino, 2005. "The Political Determinants of Federal Expenditure at the State Level," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 95-113, April.
    2. Eicher, Theo S. & García-Peñalosa, Cecilia & Kuenzel, David J., 2018. "Constitutional rules as determinants of social infrastructure," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 182-209.
    3. Edward López & R. Jewell, 2007. "Strategic institutional choice: Voters, states, and congressional term limits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 137-157, July.
    4. Vegh, Carlos A. & Vuletin, Guillermo, 2015. "Unsticking the flypaper effect in an uncertain world," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 142-155.

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