IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v91y1997i2p139-47.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

How Some Rules Just Don't Matter: The Regulation of Lobbyists

Author

Listed:
  • Lowery, David
  • Gray, Virginia

Abstract

M. F. Brinig, R. G. Holcombe, and L. Schwartzstein (1993) have argued recently that lobby regulation restricts entry into the population of lobbying organizations and that the number of lobbying organizations then influences legislative activity. However, they analyze only the relationship between the restrictiveness of lobby regulation and legislative activity, thereby assuming that regulation actually reduces numbers of registered interest organizations. The authors test this assumption with data on state interest organization populations and find little support for it. They consider several other explanations and comment more generally on the status of institutions and their rules in the study of political phenomena. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Lowery, David & Gray, Virginia, 1997. "How Some Rules Just Don't Matter: The Regulation of Lobbyists," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 91(2), pages 139-147, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:91:y:1997:i:2:p:139-47
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0048-5829/contents
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. John de Figueiredo, "undated". "The Timing, Intensity, and Composition of Interest Group Lobbying: An Analysis of Structural Policy Windows in the States," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1082, American Law & Economics Association.
    2. Ann O'M. Bowman & Neal D. Woods, 2010. "Expanding the Scope of Conflict: Interest Groups and Interstate Compacts," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 91(3), pages 669-688, September.
    3. Tim Wegenast, 2010. "Uninformed Voters for Sale: Electoral Competition, Information and Interest Groups in the US," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(2), pages 271-300, May.
    4. John M. de Figueiredo, 2004. "The Timing, Intensity, and Composition of Interest Group Lobbying: An Analysis of Structural Policy Windows in the States," NBER Working Papers 10588, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Neal D. Woods, 2008. "The Policy Consequences of Political Corruption: Evidence from State Environmental Programs," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 89(1), pages 258-271, March.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:91:y:1997:i:2:p:139-47. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.