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To Fight or Not to Fight? An Analysis of Submission, Struggle, and the Design of Contests

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  • Korber, Achim
  • Kolmar, Martin

Abstract

This paper considers the players' behavior in an asymmetric two-player contest. When do they decide to struggle and when to subjugate? Analyzing contest-success functions it is found that two crucial prerequisites for struggle or war have to be met. Thus, such an equilibrium is possible but restrictive. If a self-interested rule-setter chooses the contest-success function endogenously, the authors show that one player will always subjugate. Applications to rent-seeking and environmental regulation are discussed. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Korber, Achim & Kolmar, Martin, 1996. "To Fight or Not to Fight? An Analysis of Submission, Struggle, and the Design of Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 88(3-4), pages 381-392, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:88:y:1996:i:3-4:p:381-92
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    Cited by:

    1. Bös, Dieter, 2002. "Contests Among Bureaucrats," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 27/2002, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    2. Bos, Dieter & Kolmar, Martin, 2003. "Anarchy, efficiency, and redistribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(11), pages 2431-2457, October.
    3. Bös, Dieter & Kolmar, Martin, 2000. "Self-Correcting Mechanisms in Public Procurement: Why Award and Contract Should be Separated," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 5/2000, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    4. Dieter Bös, 2004. "Contests Among Bureaucrats," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 119(3_4), pages 359-380, June.
    5. Dieter Bös, 2002. "Contests Among Bureaucrats," CESifo Working Paper Series 807, CESifo.
    6. Körber, Achim, 1995. "Raising rivals' costs with environmental regulation: An intertemporal lobbying approach," Discussion Papers, Series II 263, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    7. Dieter Boes & Martin Kolmar, 2000. "Self-Correcting Mechanisms in Public Procurement: Why Award and Contract Should be Separated," CESifo Working Paper Series 302, CESifo.

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