IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v80y1994i3-4p275-91.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Theory of Credit Bureaus

Author

Listed:
  • Laband, David N
  • Maloney, Michael T

Abstract

When both the buyer and seller have the potential to exercise opportunistic behavior, some balancing of these malincentives must be found. Seller financing has the potential to work as a quality assurance device because the lien holder is clearly at risk when mortgaged property fails. The buyer is at risk in the amount of the down payment and installments if the property is abused. Credit bureaus act as arbitrators. The authors' model accurately predicts the shifting in contract terms to account for relative opportunism and the incidence of this contract based on changes in the relative costs and benefits. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Laband, David N & Maloney, Michael T, 1994. "A Theory of Credit Bureaus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 80(3-4), pages 275-291, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:80:y:1994:i:3-4:p:275-91
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Tirtiroglu, Dogan & Tirtiroglu, Ercan, 2020. "Seller Financing: Contracting Out of the Lemons and Moral Hazard Problems When They May Co-Exist," American Business Review, Pompea College of Business, University of New Haven, vol. 23(2), pages 335-357, November.
    2. Shaun M. Tanger & Richard Alan Seals Jr. & David N. Laband, 2011. "Does Bill Co-sponsorship Affect Campaign Contributions?: Evidence from the U.S. House of Representatives, 2000-2008," Auburn Economics Working Paper Series auwp2011-09, Department of Economics, Auburn University.
    3. Tirtiroglu, Dogan & Laband, David N., 2004. "The quality assurance role of seller financing: evidence from second mortgages," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 208-225, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:80:y:1994:i:3-4:p:275-91. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.