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Frequency of Paradox in a Common n-Winner Voting Scheme

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  • Mitchell, Douglas W
  • Trumbull, William N

Abstract

This paper investigates the extent to which a commonly used electoral scheme--voting for n candidates when there are n vacancies to fill--is likely to lead, in practice, to paradoxical results. Two types of paradox are investigated. One occurs when an increase in the number of vacancies causes a candidate to drop from the list of winners. The second occurs when the Condorcet candidate fails to win. Using a Monte Carlo study, the authors show that the likelihood of paradox can be substantial and depends critically on the degree of homogeneity of voters' preferences and on the number of voters. Copyright 1992 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Mitchell, Douglas W & Trumbull, William N, 1992. "Frequency of Paradox in a Common n-Winner Voting Scheme," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(1), pages 55-69, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:73:y:1992:i:1:p:55-69
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    Cited by:

    1. Mostapha Diss & Ahmed Doghmi, 2016. "Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 97-116, October.
    2. Kamwa, Eric & Merlin, Vincent, 2015. "Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: Consistency and paradoxes," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 130-138.
    3. Harrison-Trainor, Matthew, 2022. "An analysis of random elections with large numbers of voters," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 68-84.
    4. Kamwa, Eric, 2017. "On stable rules for selecting committees," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 36-44.

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