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The Political Economics of Wackersdorf: Why Do Politicians Stick to Their Past Decisions?

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  • Wirl, Franz

Abstract

The politicians' reactions to changing circumstances appear often sluggish. The decisions about the construction of a nuclear reprocessing plant at Wackersdorf, Germany, provide a recent example. Reprivatization of the company led to an immediate cancellation of the project due to its lack of economics. However, politicians tried (and still try) to save the project, despite a large public opposition. This may be considered as irrational because the politicians apparently account for their past investments. This paper argues that a piecemeal type of a policy is rational if voters honor both credibility and populistic decisions. Copyright 1991 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Wirl, Franz, 1991. "The Political Economics of Wackersdorf: Why Do Politicians Stick to Their Past Decisions?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 70(3), pages 343-350, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:70:y:1991:i:3:p:343-50
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    Cited by:

    1. Ikefuji, M. & Laeven, R.J.A. & Magnus, J.R. & Muris, C.H.M., 2010. "Scrap Value Functions in Dynamic Decision Problems," Discussion Paper 2010-77, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Muris, C.H.M., 2011. "Panel data econometrics and climate change," Other publications TiSEM 019be37c-ed20-4483-bebd-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Dur, Robert A J, 2001. "Why Do Policy Makers Stick to Inefficient Decisions?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(3-4), pages 221-234, June.

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