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Rational Retaliation: Superpower Response to Crisis, 1948-1979

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  • James, Patrick

Abstract

Using a modified version of Chicken, referred to as the Threat Game, Brams and Kilgour (1987a; 1987b) have developed a theoretical model of rational retaliation in superpower crises. They derive explicit thresholds for sufficient retaliation against provocations to deter them in the first place. When the retaliating move meets or is more coercive than a threshold value, it is rational for the adversaries to prefer to desist from conflict, whereas a response that is too cooperative will not provide the same incentive. Data on superpower crises from 1948 to 1979 will be used to test a modified version of the model developed by Brams and Kilgour. A description of their model, culminating in some revisions, is the point of departure. Selection of cases from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project data set, operationalization of the model and testing will follow. Finally, implications of the generally positive findings are discussed. Copyright 1991 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • James, Patrick, 1991. "Rational Retaliation: Superpower Response to Crisis, 1948-1979," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 68(1-3), pages 117-135, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:68:y:1991:i:1-3:p:117-35
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