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Conditions on social choice functions

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  • Jeffrey Richelson

Abstract

It might be tempting to view this paper simply as a compilation and collection of the conditions in the social choice literature and an orderly presentation of the relationships among these conditions. While we think that this alone would make it useful we hope this paper will serve as more than a reference guide, that it will also help systematize research in various areas. It would be interesting, for example, to take each subgroup of the rationality conditions and determine what impossibility results can be obtained when each of the conditions in the subgroup is substituted for the traditional TR, QTR and AR conditions. It would then be possible to develop an overall picture of the structure and robustness of the impossibility results for each subgroup of conditions and hence for all the rationality conditions. We would also hope that this paper would stimulate some discussion of the fairness and reasonableness of the conditions presented here. Many of the conditions covered above are, we believe, neither fair nor reasonable. Achievement of some consensus as to what constitute meaningful requirements for a social choice function would help provide a more common direction for social choice research. Copyright Center for Study of Public Choice Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 1977

Suggested Citation

  • Jeffrey Richelson, 1977. "Conditions on social choice functions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 79-110, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:31:y:1977:i:1:p:79-110
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01718975
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Andreu Mas-Colell & Hugo Sonnenschein, 1972. "General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 39(2), pages 185-192.
    2. Donald J. Brown, 1975. "Aggregation of Preferences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 89(3), pages 456-469.
    3. Blair, Douglas H. & Bordes, Georges & Kelly, Jerry S. & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1976. "Impossibility theorems without collective rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 361-379, December.
    4. Amartya Sen, 1969. "Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 36(3), pages 381-393.
    5. Herzberger, Hans G, 1973. "Ordinal Preference and Rational Choice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(2), pages 187-237, March.
    6. Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-1041, November.
    7. Wilson, Robert B., 1970. "The finer structure of revealed preference," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 348-353, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Susumu Cato, 2018. "Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(2), pages 305-328, February.

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