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Choice of compulsory insurance schemes under adverse selection

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  • William Johnson

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Suggested Citation

  • William Johnson, 1977. "Choice of compulsory insurance schemes under adverse selection," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 23-35, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:31:y:1977:i:1:p:23-35
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01718972
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mark V. Pauly, 1974. "Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 88(1), pages 44-62.
    2. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hansen, Bodil O. & Keiding, Hans, 2002. "Alternative health insurance schemes: a welfare comparison," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 739-756, September.
    2. Daniel McFadden & Carlos Noton & Pau Olivella, "undated". "Remedies for Sick Insurance," Working Papers 620, Barcelona School of Economics.
    3. B. Dahlby, 1981. "Adverse selection and Pareto improvements through compulsory insurance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 547-558, January.
    4. Dionne, Georges, 1981. "Le risque moral et la sélection adverse : une revue critique de la littérature," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 57(2), pages 193-224, avril-jui.
    5. Goulão, Catarina, 2014. "Voluntary Public Health Insurance," TSE Working Papers 14-488, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    6. Casey Rothschild & Paul D. Thistle, 2022. "Supply, demand, and selection in insurance markets: Theory and applications in pictures," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 25(4), pages 419-444, December.
    7. Catarina Goulão, 2015. "Voluntary public health insurance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(1), pages 135-157, January.

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