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The private allocation of public funds

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  • G. Philpotts

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • G. Philpotts, 1975. "The private allocation of public funds," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 25-34, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:23:y:1975:i:1:p:25-34
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01718087
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dennis Mueller & Robert Tollison & Thomas Willett, 1972. "Representative democracy via random selection," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 57-68, March.
    2. Martin Shubik, 1970. "On homo politicus and the instant referendum," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 79-84, September.
    3. James Miller, 1969. "A program for direct and proxy voting in the legislative process," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 107-113, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stephen O'Neill & Lava Prakash Yadav, 2016. "Willingness to pay towards a public good: how does a refund option affect stated values?," Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 59(2), pages 342-359, February.

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