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Individual interests and collective action

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  • James Coleman

Abstract

In this paper, I have described the beginnings of a theory of collective decisions, using as a basis the controversy which has occurred in the theory of public finance, between the individualists and the organicists. In developing such a theory, my aim is to face the most difficult of all intellectual problems in the functioning of a society: how individuals, each acting in his own self interest, can nevertheless make collective decisions, function as an ongoing society, and survive together without a “war of all against all.” In a previous paper I have indicated conditions under which this is possible without the psychic investment in the nation, which constitutes the central mechanism of this paper; but there are obviously problems in collective decisions, best illustrated in public finance, which cannot be accounted for without such a mechanism. Copyright Thomas Jefferrson Center for Political Economy, Rouss Hall, University of Virginia 1966

Suggested Citation

  • James Coleman, 1966. "Individual interests and collective action," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 49-62, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:1:y:1966:i:1:p:49-62
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01718988
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    Cited by:

    1. Hummel Jeffrey Rogers & Lavoie Don, 1994. "National Defense And The Public-Goods Problem," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2-3), pages 353-378, June.

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