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Why fight secession? Evidence of economic motivations from the American Civil War

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  • Zachary Liscow

Abstract

Why fight secession? This paper is a case study on this question, asking why the North chose to fight the South in the American Civil War. It tests a theoretical prediction that economic motivations were important, using county-level presidential election data. If economic interests like manufacturing wished to keep the Union together, they should have generated votes to do so. That prediction is borne out by the data, and explanations other than Northern economic concerns about Southern secession appear unable to explain the results, suggesting that economic motivations were important to support for fighting the South. Copyright The Author(s) 2012

Suggested Citation

  • Zachary Liscow, 2012. "Why fight secession? Evidence of economic motivations from the American Civil War," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(1), pages 37-54, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:153:y:2012:i:1:p:37-54
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9772-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Paul K. Huth, 1996. "Enduring Rivalries and Territorial Disputes, 1950-1990," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 15(1), pages 7-41, February.
    2. Patrick Bolton & Gérard Roland, 1997. "The Breakup of Nations: A Political Economy Analysis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1057-1090.
    3. Gunderson, Gerald, 1974. "The Origin of the American Civil War," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 34(4), pages 915-950, December.
    4. Goldin, Claudia Dale, 1973. "The Economics of Emancipation," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(1), pages 66-85, March.
    5. Goldin, Claudia D. & Lewis, Frank D., 1975. "The Economic Cost of the American Civil War: Estimates and Implications," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 35(2), pages 299-326, June.
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    7. Barbara F. Walter, 2006. "Building Reputation: Why Governments Fight Some Separatists but Not Others," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(2), pages 313-330, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Curtis Bram & Michael Munger, 2022. "Where you stand depends on where you live: county voting on the Texas secession referendum," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 67-79, March.
    2. Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés & Stermšek, Marko, 2014. "The Economics of Secession ? Analysing the economic impact of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia," CEPR Discussion Papers 10134, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Alexander Libman, 2015. "Words or deeds: what matters? On the role of symbolic action in political decentralization," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 801-838, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voting; War; Secession; American Civil War; D72; H77; N41;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • N41 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913

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