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A welfare simulation of mixed-member electoral systems

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  • Jin-Hyuk Kim

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  • Jin-Hyuk Kim, 2008. "A welfare simulation of mixed-member electoral systems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(3), pages 447-456, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:136:y:2008:i:3:p:447-456
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9305-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Denzau, Arthur T. & Munger, Michael C., 1986. "Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(1), pages 89-106, March.
    2. Kathleen Bawn & Michael F. Thies, 2003. "A Comparative Theory of Electoral Incentives," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 15(1), pages 5-32, January.
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