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Decision by Sortition: A Means to Reduce Rent-Seeking

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  • Lockard, Alan A

Abstract

This essay gives an overview of how a randomized decision mechanism (sortition) can be expected to reduce the intensity of self-interested activity by rent-seeking factions within democracies. The social costs of rent-seeking are briefly reviewed. I then make the case that randomization of collective decision making procedures attenuates rent-seeking expenditures. I illustrate the argument by reference to the highly contested Presidential election of 2000. Finally, I buttress that argument by comparing plurality voting and sortition within the context of Tullock's Efficient Rent-seeking model (1980). Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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  • Lockard, Alan A, 2003. "Decision by Sortition: A Means to Reduce Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(3-4), pages 435-451, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:116:y:2003:i:3-4:p:435-51
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    Cited by:

    1. Derek Clark & Tore Nilssen, 2013. "Learning by doing in contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 329-343, July.
    2. George Tridimas, 2012. "Constitutional choice in ancient Athens: the rationality of selection to office by lot," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 1-21, March.
    3. Caserta, Maurizio & Pluchino, Alessandro & Rapisarda, Andrea & Spagano, Salvatore, 2021. "Why lot? How sortition could help representative democracy," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 565(C).
    4. Walkowitz, Gari & Weiss, Arne R., 2017. "“Read my lips! (but only if I was elected)!” Experimental evidence on the effects of electoral competition on promises, shirking and trust," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 348-367.

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