IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v115y2003i3-4p347-67.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Budgetary Policy with Unified and Decentralized Appropriations Authority

Author

Listed:
  • Dharmapala, Dhammika

Abstract

The divestiture of the House Appropriations Committee in the 1880's has received considerable attention of an empirical nature. This paper presents a formal model of legislative decisionmaking, using a common agency formulation to represent interest group lobbying of legislators. This framework is used to analyze the effects of decentralizing appropriations authority. The conditions under which decentralization leads to higher spending are characterized. It is argued that the conventional view that divestiture caused higher levels of spending only holds if decentralization created barriers to lobbying and political bargaining across different committees. In addition, the role of specialized committee knowledge is examined. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Dharmapala, Dhammika, 2003. "Budgetary Policy with Unified and Decentralized Appropriations Authority," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 115(3-4), pages 347-367, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:115:y:2003:i:3-4:p:347-67
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0048-5829/contents
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Martin Gregor, 2008. "Rozpočtová pravidla a rozpočtový proces: Teorie, empirie a realita České republiky [Budgetary rules and budget process: Theory, empirics, and the case of the Czech Republic]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2008(4), pages 484-504.
    2. Ringa Raudla, 2010. "Governing budgetary commons: what can we learn from Elinor Ostrom?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 201-221, December.
    3. Wehner, Joachim, 2006. "Legislative institutions and fiscal policy," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 25509, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Martin Gregor, 2005. "Committed to Deficit: The Reverse Side of Fiscal Governance," Working Papers IES 88, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:115:y:2003:i:3-4:p:347-67. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.