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Pumpkin Pies and Public Goods: The Raffle Fundraising Strategy

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  • Duncan, Brian

Abstract

Charitable organizations, such as schools and churches, often use raffles to raise money. This article explores the economic incentives inherent in raffle fundraisers. Raffling off a prize is compared to simply asking for voluntary contributions (i.e., a raffle without a prize). Even if every contributor is risk-averse, offering a prize can increase contributions to a public good by more than the value of the prize. Thus, tying contributions to a raffle can increase the equilibrium supply of a public good. Moreover, there exists a raffle prize that maximizes the supply of public good over other prizes. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Duncan, Brian, 2002. "Pumpkin Pies and Public Goods: The Raffle Fundraising Strategy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 111(1-2), pages 49-71, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:111:y:2002:i:1-2:p:49-71
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Murat C. Mungan & Bariş K. Yörük, 2012. "Fundraising and Optimal Policy Rules," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 14(4), pages 625-652, August.
    2. Matros, Alexander, 2012. "Sad-Loser contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 155-162.
    3. Barış Yörük, 2012. "Do fundraisers select charitable donors based on gender and race? Evidence from survey data," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 25(1), pages 219-243, January.
    4. Akira Maeda, 2008. "Optimal Lottery Design for Public Financing," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(532), pages 1698-1718, October.
    5. repec:zbw:rwirep:0399 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Ramesh Johari & John N. Tsitsiklis, 2004. "Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 29(3), pages 407-435, August.
    7. Paan Jindapon & Zhe Yang, 2020. "Free riders and the optimal prize in public‐good funding lotteries," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(5), pages 1289-1312, September.
    8. Franke, Jörg & Leininger, Wolfgang, 2013. "On the Efficient Provision of Public Goods by Means of Lotteries," Ruhr Economic Papers 399, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    9. Yörük, BarIs K., 2009. "How responsive are charitable donors to requests to give?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(9-10), pages 1111-1117, October.
    10. Gallier, Carlo & Reif, Christiane & Römer, Daniel, 2014. "Consistent or balanced? On the dynamics of voluntary contributions," ZEW Discussion Papers 14-060, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    11. Joseph M. Little & Kristine M. Grimsrud & Patricia A. Champ & Robert P. Berrens, 2006. "Investigation of Stated and Revealed Preferences for an Elk Hunting Raffle," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 82(4), pages 623-640.
    12. Jörg Franke & Wolfgang Leininger, 2013. "On the Efficient Provision of Public Goods by Means of Lotteries," Ruhr Economic Papers 0399, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    13. Franke, Jörg & Leininger, Wolfgang, 2014. "On the efficient provision of public goods by means of biased lotteries: The two player case," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(3), pages 436-439.

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