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Efficient Rent-Seeking in Experiment

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  • Vogt, Carsten
  • Weimann, Joachim
  • Yang, Chun-Lei

Abstract

In a series of experiments we show that people learn to play the efficient outcome in an open-ended rent-seeking game. This result persists despite quite different experiment environments and designs, like different propensities of competition, group sizes etc., and is interpretable as a resolution of the so-called Tullock paradox which states that real-world rent-seeking expenditures are much lower than what the standard rent-seeking model predicts. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Vogt, Carsten & Weimann, Joachim & Yang, Chun-Lei, 2002. "Efficient Rent-Seeking in Experiment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 110(1-2), pages 67-78, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:110:y:2002:i:1-2:p:67-78
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hannah Hörisch & Oliver Kirchkamp, 2010. "Less fighting than expected," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 347-367, July.
    2. Emmanuel Dechenaux & Dan Kovenock & Roman Sheremeta, 2015. "A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(4), pages 609-669, December.
    3. Kirchkamp, O. & Reiss, J.P. & Sadrieh, A., 2008. "A pure variation of risk in private-value auctions," Research Memorandum 050, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    4. Sheremeta, Roman, 2018. "Experimental Research on Contests," MPRA Paper 89327, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Robin Chark & Amnon Rapoport & Rami Zwick, 2011. "Experimental comparison of two multiple-stage contest designs with asymmetric players," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 305-329, June.
    6. Benedikt Herrmann & Henrik Orzen, 2008. "The appearance of homo rivalis: Social preferences and the nature of rent seeking," Discussion Papers 2008-10, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    7. Weimann, Joachim & Yang, Chun-Lei & Vogt, Carsten, 2000. "An experiment on sequential rent-seeking," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 405-426, April.
    8. Miguel A. Fonseca, 2006. "It's not how you play the game, it's winning that matters: an experimental investigation of asymmetric contests," Documentos de CERAC 2927, CERAC -Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos.
    9. Benedikt Herrmann & Henrik Orzen, 2008. "The appearance of homo rivalis: Social preferences and the nature of rent seeking," Discussion Papers 2008-10, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.

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