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Standing Tiebout on His Head: Tax Capitalization and the Monopoly Power of Local Governments

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  • Caplan, Bryan

Abstract

Much of the public finance literature argues that local governments behave competitively due to residents' ease of exit and entry. The model presented here challenges this widespread conclusion. Though it is costless to relocate to another locality, the presence of tax capitalization makes it impossible for land-owners to avoid monopolistic pricing of public services by moving; land-owners can only choose between paying the tax directly, or paying it indirectly in the form of a lower sale value for their housing if they exit. In consequence, the only real check on local governments comes through imperfectly functioning electoral channels. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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  • Caplan, Bryan, 2001. "Standing Tiebout on His Head: Tax Capitalization and the Monopoly Power of Local Governments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 108(1-2), pages 101-122, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:108:y:2001:i:1-2:p:101-22
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Lang, Corey, 2018. "Assessing the efficiency of local open space provision," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 12-24.
    2. Kjell Hausken & John F. Knutsen, 2002. "The Birth, Adjustment and Death of States," Public Economics 0205004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Hausken, Kjell & Knutsen, John F., 2010. "An enabling mechanism for the creation, adjustment, and dissolution of states and governmental units," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 4, pages 1-38.
    4. Vlad Tarko & Andrew Farrant, 2019. "The efficiency of regulatory arbitrage," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 141-166, October.
    5. Edward Stringham, 2006. "Overlapping Jurisdictions, Proprietary Communities, and Competition in the Realm of Law," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(3), pages 516-534, September.
    6. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2016. "A positive theory of the predatory state," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(3), pages 153-175, September.
    7. Edward McPhail & Vlad Tarko, 2017. "The evolution of governance structures in a polycentric system," Chapters, in: Morris Altman (ed.), Handbook of Behavioural Economics and Smart Decision-Making, chapter 16, pages 290-314, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    8. Göbel, Jürgen, 2009. "In search of an appropriate tax base for local Leviathans," MPRA Paper 13940, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Brian K. Strow & Claudia W. Strow, 2024. "Foreign-Born Residents and the Optimal Provision of Public Goods: An Application of Lindahl Pricing and Tiebout Sorting," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 39(Summer 20), pages 31-56.
    10. Stringham, Edward P. & Miller, Jennifer K. & Clark, Jeff Ray, 2010. "Internalizing Externalities Through Private Zoning: The Case of Walt Disney Company's Celebration, Florida," Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy, Mid-Continent Regional Science Association, vol. 40(2), pages 1-8.
    11. Thomas Apolte, 2004. "Die eigentümliche Diskussion um Zentralisierung und Dezentralisierung in der Europapolitik," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 5(3), pages 271-291, August.

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