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Representation, Voluntary Retirement, and Shirking in the Last Term

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  • Tien, Charles

Abstract

There is disagreement over whether or not representatives shirk. Previous studies, however, have used raw interest group scores that do not allow for accurate comparisons over time. I take advantage of recently published indexed ADA scores by Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999) that adjust for temporal differences to test for shirking. I compare results from adjusted ADA scores to Poole and Rosenthal's Nominate scores. With a simple, straightforward test of dyadic representation, I provide additional evidence that shirking exists among voluntarily retiring members of Congress. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Tien, Charles, 2001. "Representation, Voluntary Retirement, and Shirking in the Last Term," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 106(1-2), pages 117-130, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:106:y:2001:i:1-2:p:117-30
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    Cited by:

    1. René Lindstädt & Ryan Wielen, 2011. "Timely shirking: time-dependent monitoring and its effects on legislative behavior in the U.S. Senate," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 119-148, July.
    2. Yakovlev, Pavel A. & Tosun, Mehmet S. & Lewis, William P., 2018. "The Fiscal Consequences of State Legislative Term Limits," Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy, Mid-Continent Regional Science Association, vol. 48(3), January.
    3. Chen, Yu-Fu & Zoega, Gylfi, 2015. "A non-perpetual shirking model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 98-101.
    4. Yakovlev, Pavel & Tosun, Mehmet S. & Lewis, William P., 2012. "Legislative Term Limits and State Aid to Local Governments," IZA Discussion Papers 6456, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. Glenn Parker & Matthew Dabros, 2012. "Last-period problems in legislatures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 789-806, June.

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