IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v102y2000i1-2p19-23.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

How to Succeed at Increasing Spending without Really Trying: The Balanced Budget Amendment and the Item Veto

Author

Listed:
  • Gabel, Matthew J
  • Hager, Gregory L

Abstract

Congressional efforts at budgetary reform generally contain procedural impediments designed to limit profligate spending. In particular, the line-item veto and the balanced budget amendment are intended to limit the ability of legislators to pursue their constituents' interests through pork-barrel politics at the expense of the broader public interest. However, assuming that legislators remain motivated by local constituent interests, we argue that these reforms will promote unexpected results. The supermajorities requires by the line-item veto and the balanced budget amendment include incentives for log-rolling that promote--and may indeed increase--pork-barrel spending. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Gabel, Matthew J & Hager, Gregory L, 2000. "How to Succeed at Increasing Spending without Really Trying: The Balanced Budget Amendment and the Item Veto," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 102(1-2), pages 19-23, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:102:y:2000:i:1-2:p:19-23
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0048-5829/contents
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dongwon Lee & Thomas E. Borcherding & Youngho Kang, 2014. "Public Spending and the Paradox of Supermajority Rule," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 80(3), pages 614-632, January.
    2. Dongwon Lee, 2016. "Supermajority rule and bicameral bargaining," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 53-75, October.
    3. Jinhee Jo & Lawrence S. Rothenberg, 2020. "Budgetary choices and institutional rules: veto rules and budget volatility," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 1-25, March.
    4. Dongwon Lee, 2015. "Supermajority rule and the law of 1/n," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(3), pages 251-274, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:102:y:2000:i:1-2:p:19-23. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.