Efficiency of Atomic Splittable Selfish Routing with Polynomial Cost Functions
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DOI: 10.1007/s11067-007-9017-8
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- Patrick T. Harker, 1988. "Multiple Equilibrium Behaviors on Networks," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 22(1), pages 39-46, February.
- José R. Correa & Andreas S. Schulz & Nicolás E. Stier-Moses, 2004. "Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 29(4), pages 961-976, November.
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- Hai-Jun Huang & Tian-Liang Liu & Xiaolei Guo & Hai Yang, 2011. "Inefficiency of Logit-Based Stochastic User Equilibrium in a Traffic Network Under ATIS," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 255-269, June.
- Tatsuya Iwase & Yukihiro Tadokoro & Daisuke Fukuda, 2017. "Self-Fulfilling Signal of an Endogenous State in Network Congestion Games," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 889-909, September.
- Feng, Zengzhe & Gao, Ziyou & Sun, Huijun, 2014. "Bounding the inefficiency of atomic splittable selfish traffic equilibria with elastic demands," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 31-43.
- Tobias Harks & Konstantin Miller, 2011. "The Worst-Case Efficiency of Cost Sharing Methods in Resource Allocation Games," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 59(6), pages 1491-1503, December.
- Yasushi Masuda & Akira Tsuji, 2019. "Congestion Control for a System with Parallel Stations and Homogeneous Customers Using Priority Passes," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 293-318, March.
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Keywords
Price of anarchy; Equilibrium; Selfish routing; System optimum; Network;All these keywords.
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