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A Theory of Predictable Excess Returns in Real Estate

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  • Spiegel, Matthew
  • Strange, William

Abstract

A principal-agent model is employed to characterize the equilibrium mortgage contract. The value of a house depends on the actions of its owner but affects the wealth of both the owner and the lender who writes the mortgage contract with which the house is purchased. Because of this, the buyer is exposed to moral hazard. In some situations, this can lead to inefficient maintenance and predictable excess returns to home ownership. Even though there are potential buyers willing to pay back more money, the bank will not write loans for these consumers because of the adverse incentive effects of such an action. Copyright 1992 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Spiegel, Matthew & Strange, William, 1992. "A Theory of Predictable Excess Returns in Real Estate," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 375-392, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jrefec:v:5:y:1992:i:4:p:375-92
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    Cited by:

    1. Dietz, Robert D. & Haurin, Donald R., 2003. "The social and private micro-level consequences of homeownership," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 401-450, November.
    2. Christopher J. Mayer & Tomasz Piskorski & Alexei Tchistyi, 2010. "The Inefficiency of Refinancing: Why Prepayment Penalties Are Good for Risky Borrowers," NBER Working Papers 16586, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Matthew Spiegel, 1999. "Housing Return And Construction Cycles," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm114, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Mar 2001.
    4. Spiegel, Matthew, 1999. "Housing Return and Construction Cycles," Research Program in Finance, Working Paper Series qt8647j8gq, Research Program in Finance, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    5. Mehmet Balcilar & Rangan Gupta & Ricardo M. Sousa & Mark E. Wohar, 2021. "What Can Fifty-Two Collateralizable Wealth Measures Tell Us About Future Housing Market Returns? Evidence from U.S. State-Level Data," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 62(1), pages 81-107, January.
    6. Matthew Spiegel, 1999. "Housing Return And Construction Cycles," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm114, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Mar 2001.
    7. Mayer, Chris & Piskorski, Tomasz & Tchistyi, Alexei, 2013. "The inefficiency of refinancing: Why prepayment penalties are good for risky borrowers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(3), pages 694-714.
    8. William Goetzmann & Matthew Spiegel, 2000. "The Policy Implications of Portfolio Choice in Underserved Mortgage Markets," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm161, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Mar 2001.
    9. William Goetzmann & Matthew Spiegel, 2000. "The Policy Implications of Portfolio Choice in Underserved Mortgage Markets," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm161, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Mar 2001.
    10. Daniel, Kent & Hirshleifer, David & Teoh, Siew Hong, 2002. "Investor psychology in capital markets: evidence and policy implications," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 139-209, January.

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