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Capital Distribution Policy and Information Asymmetry: A Real Estate Market Perspective

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  • Downs, David H
  • Guner, Z Nuray
  • Patterson, Gary A

Abstract

This article examines the relation between the distribution of capital to real estate investors and a market-based measure of information asymmetry. Previous research suggests that information asymmetries decrease as capital is distributed to outside investors. However, little attention has been given to those firms for which the marginal benefit of increased distributions may be small. Our analyses are based on a sample of real estate investment trusts (REITs), which are popularly characterized as high yield investments due to the regulation of a minimum distribution policy. The extent to which information asymmetry is influenced by these regulations, as well as by the opaque nature of the underlying assets, is an interesting empirical question. The results based on several years of data indicate that the perception of asymmetric information is lower for REM that distribute more capital to their shareholders. A decomposition of yield into income and return-of-capital components reveals no differential effect in information relevance. The insights drawn from the results may be useful in determining the efficacy of real estate capital distribution policies and regulations. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Downs, David H & Guner, Z Nuray & Patterson, Gary A, 2000. "Capital Distribution Policy and Information Asymmetry: A Real Estate Market Perspective," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 235-250, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jrefec:v:21:y:2000:i:3:p:235-50
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    Cited by:

    1. Paul Anglin & Robert Edelstein & Yanmin Gao & Desmond Tsang, 2011. "How Does Corporate Governance Affect the Quality of Investor Information? The Curious Case of REITs," Journal of Real Estate Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(1), pages 1-24, January.
    2. Daniel Broxterman & Tingyu Zhou, 2023. "Information Frictions in Real Estate Markets: Recent Evidence and Issues," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 66(2), pages 203-298, February.
    3. Chinmoy Ghosh & Scott Roark & C. Sirmans, 2013. "On The Operating Performance of REITs Following Seasoned Equity Offerings: Anomaly Revisited," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(4), pages 633-663, May.
    4. Zhilan Feng & Chinmoy Ghosh & C. Sirmans, 2007. "CEO Involvement in Director Selection: Implications for REIT Dividend Policy," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 385-410, November.
    5. Benjamin Blau & Jared F. Egginton & Matthew Hill, 2016. "REITs and market friction," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 1-24, January.
    6. SeungHan Ro & Paul Gallimore, 2014. "Real Estate Mutual Funds: Herding, Momentum Trading and Performance," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 42(1), pages 190-222, March.
    7. Rob Bauer & Piet Eichholtz & Nils Kok, 2010. "Corporate Governance and Performance: The REIT Effect," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 38(1), pages 1-29, March.
    8. Zhilan Feng & Chinmoy Ghosh & C. Sirmans, 2007. "Director Compensation and CEO Bargaining Power in REITs," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 225-251, October.
    9. Wen-Hsiu Chou & William Hardin & Matthew Hill & G. Kelly, 2013. "Dividends, Values and Agency Costs in REITs," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 91-114, January.
    10. Zhilan Feng & Chinmoy Ghosh & Fan He & C. Sirmans, 2010. "Institutional Monitoring and REIT CEO Compensation," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 40(4), pages 446-479, May.
    11. George D. Cashman & David M. Harrison & Shelly Howton & Benjamin Scheick, 2023. "The Cost of Financial Flexibility: Information Opacity, Agency Conflicts and REIT at-the-Market (ATM) Equity Offerings," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 66(2), pages 505-541, February.
    12. Benjamin Blau & Jared Egginton & Matthew Hill, 2016. "REITs and market friction," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 1-24, January.
    13. Rakesh Kumar Sharma, 2021. "Factors influencing dividend decisions of Indian construction, housing and real estate companies: An empirical panel data analysis," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(4), pages 5666-5683, October.

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