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The Grasshoppers and the Great Cattle: Participation and Non-Participation in the ASB's Standard-Setting Process

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  • Doreen Gilfedder
  • Ciarán Ó hÓgartaigh

Abstract

This paper presents the results of a research study of participation in the accounting standard-setting process in the United Kingdom. The study considers the 1,519 responses to the Accounting Standards Board's ('the ASB') proposals for accounting standards. Consistent with the findings of other studies in the USA and Australia, the present paper finds that there is a high level of participation by the preparers of financial statements in the ASB's consultation process. The paper then examines the size of the preparer firms which formally lobby the ASB. The evidence confirms that those firms which become involved in the lobbying process in the UK tend to be larger than non-lobbying firms, and the paper concludes that, as elswhere, the standard-setting process in the UK appears to be a discourse of the powerful. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

Suggested Citation

  • Doreen Gilfedder & Ciarán Ó hÓgartaigh, 1998. "The Grasshoppers and the Great Cattle: Participation and Non-Participation in the ASB's Standard-Setting Process," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 2(3), pages 287-296, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jmgtgv:v:2:y:1998:i:3:p:287-296
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1009911411266
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Francis, Jere R., 1987. "Lobbying against proposed accounting standards: The case of employers' pension accounting," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 35-57.
    2. Cooper, David J. & Sherer, Michael J., 1984. "The value of corporate accounting reports: Arguments for a political economy of accounting," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 9(3-4), pages 207-232, October.
    3. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    4. Zmijewski, Mark E. & Hagerman, Robert L., 1981. "An income strategy approach to the positive theory of accounting standard setting/choice," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 129-149, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Maroun, Warren & van Zijl, Wayne, 2016. "Isomorphism and resistance in implementing IFRS 10 and IFRS 12," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 220-239.

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