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Infant Firm Subsidization in Industries with Dynamic Structure

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  • Vladimir Petkov

Abstract

This paper analyzes time-consistent subsidies in industries with strong learning effects and frequent entry and exit. Structural dynamics create opportunities for strategic behavior: by influencing government policies, infant firms can reduce their tax burden and weaken future competitors. Two balanced-budget subsidy regimes are considered: (1) intra-industry redistribution; and (2) outside funding. We show that the choice of funding method does not affect equilibrium welfare. In both cases, the regulator is able to attain the constrained optimum. This result does not depend on the functional form of payoffs and holds in both price and quantity games. In linear-quadratic examples, we compute the equilibrium strategies. We show that (1) government intervention amplifies transitional price and output fluctuations and (2) the steady-state subsidy rate and infant production are decreasing in the speed of learning. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Suggested Citation

  • Vladimir Petkov, 2007. "Infant Firm Subsidization in Industries with Dynamic Structure," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 73-93, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jincot:v:7:y:2007:i:2:p:73-93
    DOI: 10.1007/s10842-007-0004-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jovanovic, Boyan & Nyarko, Yaw, 1996. "Learning by Doing and the Choice of Technology," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1299-1310, November.
    2. Miravete, Eugenio J., 2003. "Time-consistent protection with learning by doing," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 761-790, October.
    3. Dasgupta, Partha & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1988. "Learning-by-Doing, Market Structure and Industrial and Trade Policies," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 40(2), pages 246-268, June.
    4. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1983. "Learning-by-Doing and Market Performance," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 522-530, Autumn.
    5. Dermot Leahy & J. Peter Neary, 1999. "Learning by Doing, Precommitment and Infant-Industry Promotion," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(2), pages 447-474.
    6. D Leahy & J.P. Neary, 1995. "Learning by Doing," CEP Discussion Papers dp0251, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    learning-by-doing; regulation; Markov-perfect equilibrium; linear-quadratic games; L50; L13; C73;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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