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Collusion in Industrial Economics: A Comment

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  • Robert Porter

Abstract

This note comments on Feuerstein's (2005) summary of the literature on collusion in infinitely repeated games. It specifically addresses firm asymmetries and settings in which punishments can be asymmetric. Changes in competition policy such as exception from punishment for the first but only the first compliant and the recent practice to study the effects of mergers after the fact, will provide interesting material for testing the theoretical predictions. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Porter, 2005. "Collusion in Industrial Economics: A Comment," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 231-234, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jincot:v:5:y:2005:i:3:p:231-234
    DOI: 10.1007/s10842-005-4873-8
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    Cited by:

    1. Switgard Feuerstein, 2005. "Collusion in Industrial Economics—A Rejoinder," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 235-239, December.
    2. Xiaowei Wang & Kunhui Ye & Taozhi Zhuang & Rui Liu, 2022. "The Influence of Collusive Information Dissemination on Bidder’s Collusive Willingness in Urban Construction Projects," Land, MDPI, vol. 11(5), pages 1-14, April.

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    Keywords

    cartel; collusion;

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