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Financial Regulatory Structure and the Resolution of Conflicting Goals

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  • Larry Wall
  • Robert Eisenbeis

Abstract

The debate over modernizing the financial structure is raising questions about the merits of modernizing the financial regulatory structure. Regulatory structure is important because an almost unavoidable feature of our current system of government is that Congress assigns multiple goals that sometimes have conflicting policy implications to the regulatory agencies. The structure of the agencies is important to the resolution of these conflicts. Responsibility for two or more goals that have conflicting implications may be assigned to a single agency that is likely to resolve the conflict with a consistent set of policies based on the agency's priorities. Alternatively, the goals may be assigned to more than one agency, an action that often results in the conflicts being debated in the public arena but that may also result in the agencies' implementing inconsistent policies. This paper uses the problem of goal conflicts to provide a framework for evaluating alternative regulatory structures.
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  • Larry Wall & Robert Eisenbeis, 1999. "Financial Regulatory Structure and the Resolution of Conflicting Goals," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 16(2), pages 223-245, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jfsres:v:16:y:1999:i:2:p:223-245
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1008144526251
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    Cited by:

    1. Wall, Larry D., 2009. "Prudential Discipline for Financial Firms: Micro, Macro, and Market Structures," ADBI Working Papers 176, Asian Development Bank Institute.
    2. Robert A. Eisenbeis & Simon Kwan & Larry Wall, 2018. "Financial Stability and Resolution of Federal Reserve Goal and Implementation Conflicts," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 53(2), pages 163-178, June.
    3. Kane, Edward J., 2000. "Capital movements, banking insolvency, and silent runs in the Asian financial crisis," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 153-175, May.
    4. Robert A. Eisenbeis, 2009. "Multinational Banking and Regulatory Challenges: Lessons from the US Experience with AIG," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 7(2), pages 13-18, 07.
    5. Claeys, Sophie, 2005. "Optimal regulatory design for the Central Bank of Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 7/2005, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    6. Joseph A. Clougherty, 2005. "Antitrust holdup source, cross‐national institutional variation, and corporate political strategy implications for domestic mergers in a global context," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(8), pages 769-790, August.
    7. Edward Kane, 2000. "Architecture of Supra-Governmental International Financial Regulation," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 18(2), pages 301-318, December.
    8. Larry D. Wall, 2012. "Central banking for financial stability Some lessons from the recent instability in the US and euro area," Public Policy Review, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan, vol. 8(3), pages 247-280, August.
    9. Kane, Edward J., 2002. "Using deferred compensation to strengthen the ethics of financial regulation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(9), pages 1919-1933, September.
    10. repec:zbw:bofitp:2005_007 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Edward Kane, 1999. "How Offshore Financial Competition Disciplines Exit Resistance by Incentive-Conflicted Bank Regulators," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 16(2), pages 265-291, December.
    12. Rose M. Kushmeider, 2007. "Restructuring U.S. Federal Financial Regulation," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 25(3), pages 325-340, July.
    13. repec:ces:ifodic:v:7:y:2009:i:2:p:14567113 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Robert A. Eisenbeis, 2009. "Multinational Banking and Regulatory Challenges: Lessons from the US Experience with AIG," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 7(02), pages 13-18, July.
    15. Robert A. Eisenbeis, 2009. "What We Have Learned and Not Learned from the Current Crisis about Financial Reform," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 42(4), pages 457-469, December.
    16. Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn, 2011. "Regulating the Regulators: The Changing Face of Financial Supervision Architectures Before and After the Financial Crisis," Chapters, in: Sylvester Eijffinger & Donato Masciandaro (ed.), Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision, chapter 16, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    17. Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn, 2013. "The Evolution of Financial Supervision: the Continuing Search for the Holy Grail," SUERF 50th Anniversary Volume Chapters, in: Morten Balling & Ernest Gnan (ed.), 50 Years of Money and Finance: Lessons and Challenges, chapter 8, pages 263-318, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
    18. Robert Eisenbeis & W. Frame & Larry Wall, 2007. "An Analysis of the Systemic Risks Posed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and An Evaluation of the Policy Options for Reducing Those Risks," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 31(2), pages 75-99, June.
    19. Wall, Larry D., 2012. "Central Banking for Financial Stability: Some Lessons from the Recent Instability in the United States and Euro Area," ADBI Working Papers 379, Asian Development Bank Institute.
    20. Kane, Edward J., 2000. "The dialectical role of information and disinformation in regulation-induced banking crises," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 8(3-4), pages 285-308, July.
    21. Robert A. Eisenbeis & George G. Kaufman, 2011. "The World of Unintended Consequences: A Post-Mortem on Regulation Q and Prologue for the Future," Chapters, in: Christopher J. Green & Eric J. Pentecost & Tom Weyman-Jones (ed.), The Financial Crisis and the Regulation of Finance, chapter 11, Edward Elgar Publishing.

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