Holdup and Innovation
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Abstract
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DOI: 10.1007/s00712-005-0130-1
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References listed on IDEAS
- Lemke, Robert J., 2004. "Dynamic bargaining with action-dependent valuations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(9), pages 1847-1875, July.
- P. Manzini & M. Mariotti, 1997.
"A Model of Bargaining with the Possibility of Arbitration,"
Working Papers
374, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 1997. "A Model of Bargaining with the Possibility of Arbitration," Game Theory and Information 9710001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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Cited by:
- Goetz, Renan & Yatsenko, Yuri & Hritonenko, Natali & Xabadia, Angels & Abdulai, Awudu, 2019. "The dynamics of productive assets, contract duration and holdup," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 24-37.
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More about this item
Keywords
delay; incomplete contracts; holdup; C78; D23;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
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