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Implicit contracts with effort incentives

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  • Oliver Fabel

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Suggested Citation

  • Oliver Fabel, 1990. "Implicit contracts with effort incentives," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 25-42, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:52:y:1990:i:1:p:25-42
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01227500
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1357-1367, November.
    2. Dilip Mookherjee, 1986. "Involuntary Unemployment and Worker Moral Hazard," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(5), pages 739-754.
    3. repec:bla:econom:v:55:y:1988:i:217:p:63-79 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1984. "Theories of Wage Rigidity," NBER Working Papers 1442, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1979. "Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 231-259, April.
    6. Ross M. Starr, 1973. "Optimal Production and Allocation under Uncertainty," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 87(1), pages 81-95.
    7. Brown, Murray & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 1984. "Underemployment and normal leisure," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 15(1-2), pages 157-163.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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