IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/jeczfn/v144y2025i1d10.1007_s00712-024-00883-w.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A mixed duopoly input market: uniform pricing versus spatial price discrimination

Author

Listed:
  • John S. Heywood

    (University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee)

  • Zerong Wang

    (Chinese Academy of Macroeconomic Research)

  • Guangliang Ye

    (Hainan University)

Abstract

We uniquely model an upstream mixed duopoly engaging in either uniform pricing or spatial price discrimination when facing a continuum of downstream firms. Uniform pricing generates higher welfare with a fully public firm. Uniform pricing generates greater optimal partial privatization except when the cost disadvantage of the public firm is large and downstream cost convexity is large. Similarly, welfare under optimal partial privatization is larger under uniform pricing except when the cost disadvantage of the public firm is relatively large and downstream cost convexity is large. Thus, the implications of the pricing scheme depend critically on the upstream and downstream cost structure and the ownership structure.

Suggested Citation

  • John S. Heywood & Zerong Wang & Guangliang Ye, 2025. "A mixed duopoly input market: uniform pricing versus spatial price discrimination," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 59-84, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:144:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s00712-024-00883-w
    DOI: 10.1007/s00712-024-00883-w
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00712-024-00883-w
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00712-024-00883-w?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2024. "When should the government own the physical assets needed to provide public goods?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 241(C).
    2. Marian Tokar & Hanna Kumar & Inna Kostyrya & Alona Kliuchnik, 2023. "Determining the Eastern European non-governmental organizations sustainability under crisis conditions and during social and technological transformations," Eastern-European Journal of Enterprise Technologies, PC TECHNOLOGY CENTER, vol. 6(13 (126)), pages 33-41, December.
    3. Patrick W Schmitz, 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(647), pages 2563-2577.
    4. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "The proper scope of government reconsidered: Asymmetric information and incentive contracts," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
    5. Maija Halonen-Aktawijuka & Evanjelos Parfilis, 2022. "Who Should Own the Past?," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 22/758, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mixed duopoly; Input market; Spatial price discrimination; Uniform pricing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
    • L52 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:144:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s00712-024-00883-w. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.