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Corporation Tax Asymmetries and Cartel Unity

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  • Pierre-Pascal Gendron

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of changing the extent to which tax losses are refunded to firms in a model of imperfect competition. It proposes a particular collusive equilibrium in a repeated oligopoly with homogeneous quantity-setting firms. The industry sustains tacit collusion by using credible and severe punishments of deviations. The analysis of the most collusive equilibrium with losses indicates that a tax policy which increases refunds reduces output, increases market price, and therefore strengthens tacit collusion. In addition, the policy increases government revenue. An increase in the corporation tax rate has similar effects. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

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  • Pierre-Pascal Gendron, 2001. "Corporation Tax Asymmetries and Cartel Unity," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 8(5), pages 659-674, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:8:y:2001:i:5:p:659-674
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1012876925185
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Val Eugene Lambson, 1987. "Optimal Penal Codes in Price-setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(3), pages 385-397.
    2. Pierre-Pascal Gendron, 1996. "Corporation Tax Asymmetries: An Oligopolistic Supergame Analysis," Working Papers ecpap-96-04, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Schindler & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2006. "Company Tax Reform in Europe and its Effect on Collusive Behavior," CESifo Working Paper Series 1702, CESifo.
    2. Dirk Schindler & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2009. "Harmonization of Corporate Tax Systems and Its Effect on Collusive Behavior," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(4), pages 599-621, August.
    3. Haufler, Andreas & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2004. "Tacit collusion and international commodity taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 577-600, March.

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