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Public reporting and the evolution of diabetes quality

Author

Listed:
  • Jeffrey McCullough
  • Daniel Crespin
  • Jean Abraham
  • Jon Christianson
  • Michael Finch

Abstract

We address three questions related to public reports of diabetes quality. First, does clinic quality evolve over time? Second, does the quality of reporting clinics converge to a common standard? Third, how persistent are provider quality rankings across time? Since current methods of public reporting rely on historic data, measures of clinic quality are most informative if relative clinic performance is persistent across time. We use data from the Minnesota Community Measurement spanning 2007–2012. We employ seemingly-unrelated regression to measure quality improvement conditional upon cohort effects and changes in quality metrics. Basic autoregressive models are used to measure quality persistence. There were striking differences in initial quality across cohorts of clinics and early-reporting cohorts maintained higher quality in all years. This suggests that consumers can infer, on average, that non-reporting clinics have poorer quality than reporting clinics. Average quality, however, improves slowly in all cohorts and quality dispersion declines over time both within and across cohorts. Relative clinic quality is highly persistent year-to-year, suggesting that publicly-reported measures can inform consumers in choice of clinics, even though they represent measured quality for a previous time period. Finally, definition changes in measures can make it difficult to draw appropriate inferences from longitudinal public reports data. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Jeffrey McCullough & Daniel Crespin & Jean Abraham & Jon Christianson & Michael Finch, 2015. "Public reporting and the evolution of diabetes quality," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 127-138, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:ijhcfe:v:15:y:2015:i:1:p:127-138
    DOI: 10.1007/s10754-015-9167-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Wang, Justin & Hockenberry, Jason & Chou, Shin-Yi & Yang, Muzhe, 2011. "Do bad report cards have consequences? Impacts of publicly reported provider quality information on the CABG market in Pennsylvania," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 392-407, March.
    2. David Dranove & Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan & Mark Satterthwaite, 2003. "Is More Information Better? The Effects of "Report Cards" on Health Care Providers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(3), pages 555-588, June.
    3. Ginger Zhe Jin, 2005. "Competition and Disclosure Incentives: An Empirical Study of HMOs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(1), pages 93-112, Spring.
    4. Kyoungrae Jung, 2010. "Incentives for Voluntary Disclosure of Quality Information in HMO Markets," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 183-210, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public reporting; Quality measurement; Diabetes ; Longitudinal analysis; I11; I18; C22;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • C22 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models; Diffusion Processes

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