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Contract federalism

Author

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  • P. Spahn
  • Oliver Franz

Abstract

This major Handbook addresses fiscal relations between different levels of government under the general rubric of ‘fiscal federalism’, providing a review of the latest literature as well as an invaluable guide for practitioners and policy makers seeking informed policy options. The contributors include leading lights in the field, many of whom have themselves made seminal contributions to the literature.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • P. Spahn & Oliver Franz, 2002. "Contract federalism," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 8(2), pages 172-172, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:iaecre:v:8:y:2002:i:2:p:172-172:10.1007/bf02295356
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02295356
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    Cited by:

    1. Ahmad, Ehtisham, 2009. "Fiscal policy instruments and the political economy of designing programs to reach the poorest," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 38344, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Marisa Faggini & Anna Parziale, 2017. "Fitness Landscape and Tax Planning: NK Model for Fiscal Federalism," International Journal of Economics and Finance, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 9(7), pages 14-31, July.
    3. Marco Alderighi & Christophe Feder, 2014. "Political competition, power allocation and welfare in unitary and federal systems," Working Paper series 23_14, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.

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