IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/iaecre/v12y2006i3p395-40710.1007-s11294-006-9027-1.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Rent Seeking Behavior in Transition Countries: The Case of Romania

Author

Listed:
  • Ileana Tache
  • Dorin Lixandroiu

Abstract

This paper points out, in the changing institutional setting of transition in Romania, Some relevant factors influencing economic actors to behave in a way that pushes them to devote resources to unproductive goals, rather than to embark on activities that add economic and social value. The theoretical insights offered in the literature of rent seeking are applied to the issues of transition. A mathematical model of a rent seeking economy is presented, analyzing the influence of interest groups activity on the overall income of the economy. Some examples of rent seeking behavior that severely hamper the economic efficiency are illustrated for the case of Romania. The conclusion is that, in appreciating the progress in transition, the reduction in rent seeking is an important factor to be taken into consideration. Copyright IAES 2006

Suggested Citation

  • Ileana Tache & Dorin Lixandroiu, 2006. "Rent Seeking Behavior in Transition Countries: The Case of Romania," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 12(3), pages 395-407, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:iaecre:v:12:y:2006:i:3:p:395-407:10.1007/s11294-006-9027-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s11294-006-9027-1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11294-006-9027-1
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11294-006-9027-1?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 2008. "Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 213-218, Springer.
    2. Earle, John S. & Telegdy, Almos, 2002. "Privatization Methods and Productivity Effects in Romanian Industrial Enterprises," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 657-682, December.
    3. Annette N. Brown (ed.), 1999. "When Is Transition Over?," Books from Upjohn Press, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, number wito.
    4. Dilek Demirbas, 1999. "Rent-Seeking in Developed and Developing Countries: Cross Section and Time Series Studies," Discussion Papers in Economics 99/2, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:kap:iaecre:v:12:y:2006:i:3:p:395-407 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Marceau, Nicolas & Mongrain, Steeve, 2011. "Competition in law enforcement and capital allocation," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 136-147, January.
    3. Blackburn, Keith & Forgues-Puccio, Gonzalo F., 2009. "Why is corruption less harmful in some countries than in others?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 797-810, December.
    4. Azariadis, Costas & Stachurski, John, 2005. "Poverty Traps," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, Elsevier.
    5. Spruk, Rok, 2012. "After 20 Years of Status Quo: The Failure of Gradualism in Slovenia’s Post-Socialist Transition," MPRA Paper 36304, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. repec:elg:eechap:15325_21 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Gregorio Giménez Esteban, 2007. "Violence and Growth in Latin America," Economic Analysis Working Papers (2002-2010). Atlantic Review of Economics (2011-2016), Colexio de Economistas de A Coruña, Spain and Fundación Una Galicia Moderna, vol. 6, pages 1-34, July.
    8. Hinh Khieu & Nam H. Nguyen & Hieu V. Phan & Jon A. Fulkerson, 2023. "Political Corruption and Corporate Risk-Taking," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 184(1), pages 93-113, April.
    9. Hu, Juncheng, 2021. "Do facilitation payments affect earnings management? Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    10. Andrea Asoni, 2008. "Protection Of Property Rights And Growth As Political Equilibria," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(5), pages 953-987, December.
    11. Ichiro IWASAKI & Satoshi MIZOBATA, 2018. "Post-Privatization Ownership And Firm Performance: A Large Meta-Analysis Of The Transition Literature," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 89(2), pages 263-322, June.
    12. Mudambi, Ram & Paul, Chris, 2003. "Domestic drug prohibition as a source of foreign institutional instability: an analysis of the multinational extralegal enterprise," Journal of International Management, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 335-349.
    13. Qu, Guangjun & Sylwester, Kevin & Wang, Feng, 2016. "Anticorruption and Growth: Evidence from China," MPRA Paper 72190, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Lurdes Martins & Jorge Cerdeira & Aurora A.C. Teixeira, 2020. "Does corruption boost or harm firms’ performance in developing and emerging economies? A firm‐level study," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(8), pages 2119-2152, August.
    15. Rogers, Mark Llewellyn, 2008. "Directly unproductive schooling: How country characteristics affect the impact of schooling on growth," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 356-385, February.
    16. Godin, M. & Hindriks, J., 2015. "A Review of Critical Issues on Tax Design and Tax Administration in a Global Economy and Developing Countries," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2015028, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    17. Olivia D'Aoust & Olivier Sterck, 2016. "Who Benefits from Customary Justice? Rent-seeking, Bribery and Criminality in sub-Saharan Africa," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, vol. 25(3), pages 439-467.
    18. Arvind K. Jain, 2011. "Corruption: Theory, Evidence and Policy," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 9(2), pages 3-9, 07.
    19. Olayinka Oyekola & Sofia Johan & Rilwan Sakariyahu & Oluwatoyin Esther Dosumu & Shima Amini, 2023. "Political institutions, financial liberalisation, and access to finance: firm-level empirical evidence," Discussion Papers 2307, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
    20. Nunn, Nathan, 2007. "Historical legacies: A model linking Africa's past to its current underdevelopment," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 157-175, May.
    21. Polterovich, Victor, 2001. "Rent Seeking, Tax Policy, and Economic Growth," MPRA Paper 20058, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    22. O'Toole, Conor M. & Morgenroth, Edgar L.W. & Ha, Thuy T., 2016. "Investment efficiency, state-owned enterprises and privatisation: Evidence from Viet Nam in Transition," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 93-108.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    057; 050; D23; L51; transition countries; rent seeking behavior; unproductive activities; clientelism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:iaecre:v:12:y:2006:i:3:p:395-407:10.1007/s11294-006-9027-1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.