Uncertainty, Learning and International Environmental Agreements: The Role of Risk Aversion
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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-018-0295-z
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More about this item
Keywords
International environmental agreements; Uncertainty; Learning and risk aversion; Game theory;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
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