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Modeling Effort and Lobbying in a Heterogeneous Common Pool Resource Setting

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  • Matthew Freeman
  • Christopher Anderson

Abstract

Extraction from a common pool resource (CPR), such as a fishery, can lead to socially inefficient and undesirable outcomes as a result of appropriation problems. Through regulation of the CPR, users may achieve a more profitable and socially efficient outcome. Feeny et al. (Land Econ 72(2):187–205, 1996 ) delve into some of the assumptions made by traditional CPR models and how use of those assumptions provides an incomplete framework to guide fishery policy. In the theoretical models we develop, we relax two of those assumptions: CPR users are homogeneous and are unable to create, or influence, management of the resource. We note a case where regulation of the individual user can induce others to harvest more, and relate this to the slippage effect concept. Regarding resource sustainability, we document situations where incentives exist for CPR users to lobby for tighter regulations and thus increase profits by limiting the tragedy of the commons influence. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Matthew Freeman & Christopher Anderson, 2013. "Modeling Effort and Lobbying in a Heterogeneous Common Pool Resource Setting," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 56(3), pages 399-414, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:56:y:2013:i:3:p:399-414
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-013-9653-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Freeman, Matthew A. & Anderson, Christopher M., 2017. "Competitive Lobbying over Common Pool Resource Regulations," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 123-129.
    2. Christian Ewerhart, 2015. "Contest success functions: the common-pool perspective," ECON - Working Papers 195, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.

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