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Optimal incentives to reduce transboundary emissions: Theory and empirical illustration to sulphur emissions in Austria and (former) Czechoslovakia

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  • Claus Huber
  • Franz Wirl

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Claus Huber & Franz Wirl, 1996. "Optimal incentives to reduce transboundary emissions: Theory and empirical illustration to sulphur emissions in Austria and (former) Czechoslovakia," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 23(2), pages 149-172, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:empiri:v:23:y:1996:i:2:p:149-172
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00925337
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Amann, Markus & Hordijk, Leen & Klaassen, Ger & Schopp, Wolfgang & Sorensen, Lene, 1992. "Economic restructuring in Eastern Europe and acid rain abatement strategies," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 20(12), pages 1186-1197, December.
    2. Frederick Ploeg & Aart Zeeuw, 1992. "International aspects of pollution control," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 117-139, March.
    3. Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 1992. "Incentives for Conservation and Quality-Improvement by Public Utilities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1321-1340, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:17:y:2004:i:4:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. repec:zbw:hohpro:336-11 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Helm, Carsten & Wirl, Franz, 2014. "The principal–agent model with multilateral externalities: An application to climate agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 141-154.
    4. repec:old:wpaper:336-11 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Huber, Claus & Wirl, Franz, 1998. "The Polluter Pays versus the Pollutee Pays Principle under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 69-87, January.
    6. Norimichi Matsueda, 2004. "Potential Failure of an International Environmental Agreement under Asymmetric Information," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 17(4), pages 1-8.
    7. Carsten Helm & Franz Wirl, 2011. "International Environmental Agreements: Incentive Contracts with Multilateral Externalities," Working Papers V-336-11, University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2011.
    8. Rudolf Kerschbamer & Nina Maderner, 2001. "Optimal Control of Upstream Pollution under Asymmetric Information," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 19(4), pages 343-360, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strategic behaviour; second best; principal agent theory; transboundary emissions; sulphur dioxide; D82; H23;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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