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Fiscal restrictions and monetary union: Rationales, repercussions, reforms

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  • Barry Eichengreen
  • Jürgen Hagen

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  • Barry Eichengreen & Jürgen Hagen, 1996. "Fiscal restrictions and monetary union: Rationales, repercussions, reforms," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 23(1), pages 3-23, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:empiri:v:23:y:1996:i:1:p:3-23
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00925006
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    1. Laves, Walter H. C., 1935. "Foreign Bondholders and American State Debts. By Reginald C. McGrane. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1935. Pp. vii, 410.)," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 29(4), pages 686-687, August.
    2. Bertola, Giuseppe & Drazen, Allan, 1993. "Trigger Points and Budget Cuts: Explaining the Effects of Fiscal Austerity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 11-26, March.
    3. Alesina, Alberto & Hausmann, Ricardo & Hommes, Rudolf & Stein, Ernesto, 1999. "Budget institutions and fiscal performance in Latin America," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 253-273, August.
    4. Fratianni, Michele & von Hagen, Jurgen & Waller, Christopher J, 1997. "Central Banking as a Political Principal-Agent Problem," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(2), pages 378-393, April.
    5. Fratianni, M. & Von Hagen, J. & Waller, C., 1992. "The Maastricht Way to EMU," Princeton Studies in International Economics 187, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
    6. Calvo, Guillermo A, 1988. "Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 647-661, September.
    7. Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Vines, David, 1991. "Adjustment Difficulties within a European Monetary Union: Can They be Reduced?," CEPR Discussion Papers 517, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Robert Holzmann & Yves Hervé & Roland Demmel, 1996. "The maastricht fiscal criteria: Required but ineffective?," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 23(1), pages 25-58, February.
    9. Buiter, Willem H. & Corsetti, Giancarlo & Roubini, Nouriel, 1992. "`Excessive Deficits': Sense and Nonsense in the Treaty of Maastricht," CEPR Discussion Papers 750, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Eichengreen, Barry & Ghironi, Fabio, 1995. "European Monetary Unification: The Challenges Ahead," CEPR Discussion Papers 1217, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Rolnick, Arthur J & Weber, Warren E, 1983. "New Evidence on the Free Banking Era," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(5), pages 1080-1091, December.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Rodden, Jonathan, 2003. "Reviving Leviathan: Fiscal Federalism and the Growth of Government," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(4), pages 695-729, October.
    2. Sola, Sergio & Palomba, Geremia, 2016. "Sub-nationals' risk premia in fiscal federations: Fiscal performance and institutional design," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 165-187.
    3. Robert Holzmann & Yves Hervé & Roland Demmel, 1996. "The maastricht fiscal criteria: Required but ineffective?," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 23(1), pages 25-58, February.
    4. Jürgen Von Hagen, 1999. "Macroeconomic Consequences of the EMU," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 26(4), pages 359-374, December.
    5. Dimitrios Argyroulis, 2023. "The European Semester: An Ordoliberal Construct?," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(1), pages 143-160, January.
    6. Pierre-Yves Hénin, 1997. "Soutenabilité des déficits et ajustements budgétaires," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 48(3), pages 371-395.
    7. Waltraud Schelkle, 2010. "Good Governance in Crisis or a Good Crisis for Governance? A Comparison of the EU and the US," LEQS – LSE 'Europe in Question' Discussion Paper Series 16, European Institute, LSE.
    8. Thomas Uril, 2001. "Avoiding excessive deficits with fiscal coordination light," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 36(6), pages 281-285, November.
    9. Auerbach, Alan J, 2019. "Fiscal Policy," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt6jn5158q, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    10. Easterly, William, 1999. "When is fiscal adjustment an illusion?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2109, The World Bank.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Maastricht Treaty; Excessive Deficit Procedure; EMU; E61; H60; H87;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

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