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Manipulating uncertainty

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Abstract

Uncertainty about the distributional incidence of policy reforms may, if it impinges selectively on particular subsets of voters, alter the direction of the majority vote. This possibility should be a matter of special concern when subject to potential manipulation by a purposeful agent such as a Leviathan-like bureaucracy. This paper discusses a constitutional defense against such prospect. Copyright George Mason University 1994

Suggested Citation

  • A. Barbosa, 1994. "Manipulating uncertainty," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 255-271, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:5:y:1994:i:3:p:255-271
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02393260
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1978. "Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 27-43, December.
    2. John C. Harsanyi, 1955. "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(4), pages 309-309.
    3. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-1155, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Sutter, 1998. "Calculation of Self-Interest and Constitutional Consensus: The Role of Ideology," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 323-333, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    D71; D72;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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