Hume’s liberalism based on Scottish jurisprudence

This study develops a view of Hume’s is/ought distinction as an extension of Scottish jurisprudence that, in turn, was influenced by Pufendorf’s discussion of entia moralia. Further, it investigates the unique role that Hume’s sentimentalism played in the production of elements in the context of liberalism under the rule of law, independently of previous philosophical traditions. First, we observe that Hume’s is/ought distinction corresponds to a distinction between uncivilized and civilized entities, rather than between amoral rationality and moral passions. Next, analyzing Hume’s argument for “moral evidence,” we find that such evidence is necessary for various activities, such as consent or trading, in the field of moral entities as civil societies. Finally, a study of Hume’s stance with respect to civil and common laws shows that his moral sentimentalism, which includes the is/ought distinction and moral evidence, suggests a new possibility for social development that is distinct from previous rational forms of jurisprudence. From this discussion, a unique sprout of modern liberalism can be seen in Hume’s theory of justice.