IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/copoec/v35y2024i3d10.1007_s10602-023-09415-y.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Comment on “The best Condorcet‑compatible election method: Ranked Pairs”

Author

Listed:
  • Markus Schulze

Abstract

In the paper “The best Condorcet‑compatible election method: Ranked Pairs” (Munger in Const Polit Econ 2023. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-022-09382-w ), the author identifies Tideman's ranked pairs method as the best single-winner voting method, while the Schulze method (Schulze in Soc Choice Welf 36(2):267–303, 2011; The Schulze method of voting, 2018. https://arxiv.org/pdf/1804.02973v12.pdf ) comes in a close second. Munger (Munger in Const Polit Econ 2023. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-022-09382-w ) writes: “Beatpath (Schulze) emerges as Ranked Pair's chief competitor”. In this comment, I will show that the scenario that Munger uses to argue against the Schulze method is not possible.

Suggested Citation

  • Markus Schulze, 2024. "Comment on “The best Condorcet‑compatible election method: Ranked Pairs”," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 439-442, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:35:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s10602-023-09415-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-023-09415-y
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10602-023-09415-y
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10602-023-09415-y?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ranked pairs; Schulze; Beatpath; Kemeny–Young; Ranked choice ballots;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • K16 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Election Law
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:35:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s10602-023-09415-y. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.