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Much ado about nothing: voting in sixteenth-century Republic of Genoa

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  • M. Cristina Molinari

    (Ca’ Foscari University of Venice)

Abstract

When the constitution of the Republic of Genoa was rewritten in 1528, the traditional distinction between nobili and popolari was abolished and the now unified ruling class was organised into 28 groups called alberghi, which were granted equal political representation by an elaborate and bizarre voting mechanism. Using data on the composition of the Genoese nobility in 1528, we simulate the rounds of voting, nominations, and sortition of the electoral protocol to reveal how they determined the allocation of power. Our analysis shows that the constitutional reform could not succeed in bringing concord to the nobility, as the system was heavily biased towards the popolari (later renamed nobili nuovi), who could gain control over all key magistracies. We also show that the use of the alberghi for office allocation made the system less favourable to the nobili nuovi, but only marginally so. These results help explain the persistence of political instability in Genoa after the 1528 reform, and they shed light on the voting system reforms that followed.

Suggested Citation

  • M. Cristina Molinari, 2024. "Much ado about nothing: voting in sixteenth-century Republic of Genoa," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 327-348, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:35:y:2024:i:2:d:10.1007_s10602-023-09414-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-023-09414-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. M. Cristina Molinari, 2020. "How the Republic of Venice chose its Doge: lot-based elections and supermajority rule," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 169-187, June.
    2. Johannssen, Arne & Chukhrova, Nataliya & Castagliola, Philippe, 2022. "The performance of the hypergeometric np chart with estimated parameter," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 296(3), pages 873-899.
    3. Adelaide Baronchelli & Roberto Ricciuti & Mattia Viale, 2023. "Elite persistence in medieval Venice after the Black Death," Working Papers 01/2023, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Early modern elections; Factionalism; Genoese alberghi; Voting protocols;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques

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