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Ricardo and the farmers

Author

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  • Bengt-Arne Wickström

    (Andrássy-Universität)

Abstract

It is investigated under what conditions rents can be won through interference in the market through price subsidies. It is shown that owners of factors of production have an interest in price subsidies in the product market (which they can motivate with reference to “consumer interests”) only if the factor supply is not perfectly price elastic, the incentive for rent-seeking increasing as the price elasticity of supply decreases. It is further demonstrated that this can occur in the case of differential rents. Since differential rents are found primarily in the use of land, land owners, i.e. farmers, should have especially high incentives to engage in rent-seeking activities.

Suggested Citation

  • Bengt-Arne Wickström, 2024. "Ricardo and the farmers," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 141-149, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:35:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s10602-023-09404-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-023-09404-1
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rent creation; Rent seeking; Differential rents; Lobbying; Factor ownership; Competitive markets;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General

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