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The foundations of constitutionalism: an analysis of debaathification

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  • Jens Meierhenrich

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Jens Meierhenrich, 2008. "The foundations of constitutionalism: an analysis of debaathification," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 277-300, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:19:y:2008:i:4:p:277-300
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-008-9042-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Weingast, Barry R., 1997. "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 91(2), pages 245-263, June.
    2. William D. Nordhaus, 2002. "The Economic Consequences of a War in Iraq," NBER Working Papers 9361, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Institutional design; Constitutional design; Lustration; International law; International territorial administration; Iraq; Debaathification; D7; H1; K1; K4;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K1 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

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