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The relationships between political support, party strength, and term limits

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  • Suzanne Clain
  • Wen Mao

Abstract

This paper translates two implications of a recent game-theoretical explanation for term limitations [Mao, 2001] into an empirical context for testing. One implication involves the pattern of political support for a candidate over time and its relationship to the strength of the candidate's party. To test this implication, this study focuses on the careers of senators of the 106 th Congress and applies a suitable regression analysis. Consistent with Mao's theory, the statistical evidence suggests that the greater the strength of the candidate's party, the longer it takes for the politician's support to spread beyond his or her party. A second implication pertains to the effect of the majority party's strength on the likelihood of term limit legislation being passed. To test this implication, the study focuses on the states' stances on federal term limits, prior to 1995, and applies a probit analysis. In this case, the statistical evidence suggests that the greater the strength of the majority party, the less likely the state to have passed federal term limit legislation. The relationship is not statistically significant by conventional standards, though it is nearly so. However, taken together, these empirical results are generally supportive of Mao [2001]. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2003

Suggested Citation

  • Suzanne Clain & Wen Mao, 2003. "The relationships between political support, party strength, and term limits," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 31(1), pages 51-61, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:31:y:2003:i:1:p:51-61
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02298462
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    Cited by:

    1. Edward López & R. Jewell, 2007. "Strategic institutional choice: Voters, states, and congressional term limits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 137-157, July.
    2. Monica P. Escaleras & Peter T. Calcagno, 2009. "Does the Gubernatorial Term Limit Type Affect State Government Expenditures?," Public Finance Review, , vol. 37(5), pages 572-595, September.

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